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November 11, 2026
ASEAN Power Grid: exporters’ priorities could halve Singapore’s $22bn fuel savings
Interconnection could avoid $22bn in fuel and operating costs for Singapore over 2035–2045, but exporters’ domestic priorities could cut that to $12bn as imports fall to 22 TWh by 2045.
Summary
Regional power imports are key to Singapore’s energy transition, but its exporters must also meet their own growing demand and targets.
Planned corridors could avoid $22bn in Singapore’s fuel and operating costs over 2035–2045. If exporters prioritise their own targets and demand, imports could fall to 22 TWh by 2045 and the saving could halve to $12bn.
Imports could meet Singapore’s one-third target by volume in 2035, or 57% of demand with domestic solar, but renewables would supply just 20–23%. How much counts as low-carbon hinges on its import emissions threshold, making certified supply essential.
Realising the ASEAN Power Grid’s full value means understanding each country’s trade-offs and incentives. Use Scenario Builder to test how national pathways and transmission investments shape export availability, costs and emissions.
ASEAN decarbonisation hinges on balancing national and cross-border goals
The ASEAN Power Grid (APG) could speed up the region’s energy transition. Singapore illustrates how timely interconnection can support the transition to a cleaner power system. With limited land constraining domestic renewable energy (RE), the country remains heavily import-dependent. Its imported natural gas accounts for 95% of its electricity production, and its household electricity tariffs are among the highest in ASEAN. Delays in planned cross-border imports could therefore prolong its reliance on gas and slow its energy transition.
Singapore is already laying the groundwork for larger-scale regional power trade. Early projects, under the Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore Power Integration Project (LTMS-PIP), are testing the technical and regulatory rules needed to scale up trade.
Singapore aims to import around 6 GW of low-carbon power from large-scale import projects across ASEAN, up from its initial 4 GW target in 2022. The countries expected to supply this power are pursuing energy transitions of their own. They must meet growing demand, national targets, and reliability standards at home before they can export.
Using Scenario Builder, we test how far planned import projects could take Singapore beyond existing LTMS-PIP trade, and how exporters’ RE targets, coal limits and data centre demand affect the power available for export, trade flows and costs.
Model and scenario set-up
Model set-up
The analysis uses Scenario Builder’s medium-resolution ASEAN capacity expansion model for 2025–2045. It covers Singapore’s import projects with conditional approvals or licences from the Energy Market Authority (EMA): 1.2 GW from Vietnam, 1 GW from Cambodia, 900 MW from Peninsular Malaysia, 1 GW from Sarawak and 3.4 GW from Indonesia, modelled as solar exports from Batam.
The analysis compares existing LTMS-PIP arrangements as the business-as-usual (BAU) baseline against expanded interconnection scenarios. Trade between other ASEAN countries is not explicitly modelled.
Additional scenarios first introduce domestic RE targets (Scenario 3), then add coal expansion limits in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia alongside higher data centre demand in Malaysia (Scenario 4). Scenario 4’s coal limits and higher Malaysian demand were not modelled separately, so its results reflect their combined effect.
Overall, the analysis considers four capacity expansion scenarios, summarised below:
For full details on the input data, duplicate any of the four scenarios in this analysis directly in Scenario Builder: S1, S2, S3, S4.
Exporters’ goals could cut Singapore’s imports by 30% by 2035
Singapore’s EMA aims for power imports to meet around one third of demand by 2035, although the proposed projects had yet to reach financial close as of 2026.
Assuming the planned infrastructure is delivered, imports could meet 34–48% (27–38 TWh) of Singapore’s demand in 2035 across the expanded-corridor scenarios, rising to 57% when domestic solar is included. By 2045, however, combined coal limits and data centre demand could cut imports to one fifth of demand (22 TWh), 42% below the all-corridors scenario.
Under the LTMS-PIP baseline, Singapore imports less than 8 TWh annually from 2035, meeting roughly a tenth of demand. Enabling all planned corridors raises imports to 38 TWh in 2035. This meets nearly half of demand and reduces gas generation by about half, consistent with Ember’s analysis of the ASEAN Power Grid.
However, exporters’ domestic RE targets reduce Singapore’s imports by a quarter, with Cambodia’s interconnector operating at half capacity and Peninsular Malaysia’s exports falling by nearly three quarters. By 2045, Sarawak’s exports would halve as domestic demand grows. Vietnam remains a steady supplier at 9–10 TWh annually, as its domestic targets do not constrain exports in the model.
Corridors could avoid $22bn in fuel and operating costs by 2045
Less spare power from exporters could mean a higher fuel bill for Singapore. With only the expanded Malaysia link, Singapore’s yearly fuel and operating costs rise from $4bn in 2035 to $6bn in 2045. That totals $56bn between 2035 and 2045.
Opening every planned corridor nearly halves the 2035 bill to $2bn. Over 2035–2045, it avoids $22bn in fuel and operating costs, before accounting for the cost of the imported power itself.
Once exporting countries pursue their own RE targets, avoided costs fall to $19bn. If Malaysia’s data centre boom continues and coal limits hold in Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, savings shrink further to $12bn, about half of what full corridors could deliver. Before 2035, Singapore burns slightly more gas in the constrained scenarios, as Malaysia exports less to meet its own RE target.
Whether these avoided costs become net savings depends on imported power being priced below the gas-fired generation it displaces, as well as on exporters’ priorities and contract terms. Limited imports could prolong reliance on gas, exposing consumers to volatile global fuel prices and higher power bills.
Exporters’ policies cut emissions by up to 42% and make imports cleaner
More interconnection alone barely moves regional emissions. They stay at 1,201 MtCO₂e in 2035 unless exporters change their own policies. RE targets reduce emissions by 19% in 2035, rising to 31% when coal restrictions and higher data centre demand are combined, and 42% by 2045.
These policies also make Singapore’s imports cleaner. Domestic RE targets raise the RE share from 41% to 63% in 2035, reaching 67% with additional coal restrictions. Sarawak’s exports become 92% RE, largely from hydropower, while Peninsular Malaysia’s share rises from 9% to 40%. Coal’s share of Singapore’s imports falls from about half to 30% under RE targets, and to 17% with coal restrictions.
This matters because Singapore’s import framework sets a low-carbon threshold of 0.15 tCO₂/MWh, which coal- or gas-backed supply would not meet. But because exporters keep more of their power at home to meet their own targets, total imports shrink, so the RE content of imports rises only from 16 TWh to 18 TWh, or from 20% to 23% of Singapore’s demand.
Beyond building corridors: planning for reliable regional power trade
A regional grid is only as strong as the national systems it connects.
Planning export capacity explicitly, as Lao PDR does, gives importers more certainty than relying on surplus. Exporters, in turn, need guaranteed buyers, a need regional trading rules should address. Wheeling through third-country grids also adds complexity through mixed power sources and transit charges. Import agreements should therefore specify steady delivery volumes, verifiable low-carbon requirements, and transparent wheeling terms.
Agreements could also fund dedicated renewable capacity beyond exporters’ own needs, as proposed solar-and-storage projects around Batam aim to do. However, Indonesia has yet to decide whether part of its output must be reserved for domestic use.
Cost allocation also needs resolving early. That may require a shared method for setting transmission and wheeling charges, an assessment of how benefits are split between importers, exporters, and transit countries, and transparency on how each country sets its tariffs. These will determine who pays for the cables, how imports are priced, and how much of the avoided fuel cost reaches consumers as net savings.
For Singapore, these questions sit within its transition strategy. Without investor confidence and coordinated action across countries, planned interconnectors risk delay. Once built, their cost, security, and decarbonisation benefits should be tracked against expectations.
Build your own scenario
Scenario Builder’s ASEAN capacity expansion modelling tests how national priorities, demand growth, and interconnections affect power trade, generation mix, and costs. Duplicate Scenario 4 to challenge coal or demand assumptions. Or test additional regional sensitivities across exporting countries and compare results using Scenario Builder.
